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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal allocation of government spending
between infrastructure and health (which aﬀects labor productivity
as well as household utility) in an endogenous growth framework. A
key feature of the model is that infrastructure aﬀects not only the
production of goods but also the supply of health services. The ﬁrst
part considers the case where health enters as a ﬂow in production and
utility, whereas the second focuses on a “stock” approach. Growth-
and utility-maximizing rules for output taxation and the allocation
of public spending are derived. It is shown, in particular, that the
welfare-maximizing share of spending on health exceeds the growth-
maximizing share.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: O41, H54, I18
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2The annual loss of life from ﬁlth and bad ventilation are greater than the
loss from death or wounds in which the country has been engaged in modern
times...
The primary and most important measures, and at the same time the
most practicable, and within the recognized province of public administra-
tion, are drainage, the removal of all refuse of habitations, streets, and roads,
and the improvements of the supplies of water...
That by the combinations of all these arrangements it is probable that...
an increase of 13 years at least, may be extended to the whole of the labouring
classes.
E. Chadwick, The Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population (1842).
1 Introduction
The eﬀect of health on economic growth has been the subject of much recent
empirical and analytical research. A key premise of the literature is that
good health enhances worker productivity and stimulates growth. Bloom,
Canning, and Sevilla (2004), in a sample consisting of both developing and
industrial countries, found that good health (proxied by life expectancy) has
a sizable, positive eﬀect on economic growth. A one-year improvement in
the population’s life expectancy contributes to an increase in the long-run
growth rate of up to 4 percentage points. Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and
Miller (2004) also found that initial life expectancy has a positive eﬀect on
growth, whereas the prevalence of malaria, as well as the fraction of tropical
area (which may act as a proxy for exposure to tropical diseases) are both
negatively correlated with growth. Jamison, Lau and Wang (2004), using a
sample of 53 countries, found that improvements in health (as measured by
the survival rate of males aged between 15 and 60) accounted for about 11
percent of growth during the period 1965-90. In countries like Bolivia, Hon-
duras and Thailand, health improvements added about half of a percentage
3point to the annual rate of growth in income per capita. According to the
estimation results of Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson (2004), between 22 and
30 percent of the transition growth rate of per capita income in Sub-Saharan
Africa can be attributed to health factors. Along the same lines, Weil (2005),
using microeconomic data (such as height and adult survival rates) to build
a measure of average health, found that as much as 22.6 percent of the cross-
country variation in income per capita is due to health factors–roughly the
same as the share accounted for by human capital from education, and larger
than the share accounted for by physical capital. Conversely, estimates by
the United Nations (2005) suggest that malaria (which claims each year the
lives of 1 million people in poor countries and infects 300 million more) has
slowed economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1.3 percentage point a
year. According to a recent report on HIV-AIDS by the same institution,
in Sub-Saharan Africa–a region where on average 7 out of 100 adults, and
up to a quarter of the population in the southern part of the continent, are
HIV-positive–the epidemic has reduced annual growth rates by anywhere
between 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points (see UNAIDS (2004)).1
Accounting for health factors in models of economic growth is important
for studies focusing on developing countries–particularly the low-income
ones, where health indicators are the weakest. An important issue in that
regard relates to the fact the provision of health services requires the use
of public resources. At the macroeconomic level, there is therefore a po-
tential trade-oﬀ between health and other services that governments can
provide–such as education, security, legal protection, and infrastructure
1It should be noted, however, that with respect to industrial countries, some studies
have found evidence of reverse causation. By raising real incomes, economic growth may
enable individuals to spend more on health services. In addition, as shown by Benos (2004),
there is also evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship between health and growth.
4services. Understanding the nature of this trade-oﬀ is important because
complementarity eﬀects may exist at the microeconomic level between these
v a r i o u sc o m p o n e n t s . T h e r ei sm u c he v i dence, in particular, regarding the
relationship between infrastructure and health (see the summary by Brenne-
man and Kerf (2002)). It has been shown, for instance, that access to safe
water and sanitation helps to improve health, as recognized long ago by Ed-
win Chadwick.2 Studies by Behrman and Wolfe (1987), Lavy et al. (1996),
Lee, Rosenzweig, and Pitt (1997), Leipziger et al. (2003), and Wagstaﬀ and
Claeson (2004, pp. 170-74) found that access to clean water and sanitation
infrastructure helps to reduce infant mortality. In addition, recent surveys
suggest that in some African cities, the death rate of children under ﬁve is
about twice as high in slums (where water and sanitation services are poor,
if not inexistent), compared to other urban communities.
By reducing the cost of boiling water, access to electricity may also help
to improve hygiene and health. Availability of electricity is essential for the
functioning of hospitals and the delivery of health services (vaccines require
continuous and reliable refrigeration to retain their eﬀectiveness). Getting
access to clean energy for cooking in people’s homes (as opposed to smoky
traditional fuels, such as wood, crop residues, and charcoal) improves health
outcomes, by reducing indoor air pollution and the incidence of respiratory
illnesses. Last but not least, better transportation networks may also con-
tribute to easier access to health care, particularly in rural areas. Recent
data produced by national Demographic and Health Surveys in Sub-Saharan
Africa show that a majority of women in rural areas rank distance and inade-
quate transportation as major obstacles in accessing health care (see African
2Chadwick’s work led to the passage, in 1848, of the Public Health Act in England,
which among other measures gave boroughs responsibility for drainage, water supplies,
and paving of roads.
5Union (2005)). In Morocco, a program developed in the mid-1990s to expand
the network of rural roads led–in addition to reducing production costs and
improving access to markets–to a sizable increase in visits to primary health
care facilities and clinics (see Levy (2004)). At a more formal level, Wagstaﬀ
and Claeson (2004, pp. 170-74) found, using cross-section regressions, that
road infrastructure (as measured by the length of the paved road network)
had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on a number of health indicators, such as infant and
female mortality rates.
Despite the compelling nature of the microeconomic evidence, the link
b e t w e e nh e a l t ha n di n f r a s t r u c t u r eh a sn o tr e c e i v e dm u c ha t t e n t i o ni nt h e
existing literature on government spending and endogenous growth. In fact,
most of this literature does not account in a satisfactory manner for the
macroeconomic eﬀects of health services. In those papers that account for
government spending on “utility-enhancing services” (as for instance Barro
(1990) and Turnovsky (1996, 2000)), these services are generally described as
a government-provided consumption good; examples that are often provided
include defense and security. However, This approach is unsatisfactory to
account for health services. The reason is that models of this type almost
invariably introduce a dichotomy in the composition of public spending–
expenditure on utility-enhancing services is generally assumed not to aﬀect
the production side, whereas production-related spending (such as infrastruc-
t u r e )i sa s s u m e dt oh a v en oe ﬀect on utility-enhancing services–for the very
reason that these services are usually directly related only to an exogenous
component of government spending.
Thispapertakesabroaderperspectiveontherelationshipbetweenhealth,
infrastructure, and growth. It examines the optimal allocation of government
spending between health and infrastructure in an endogenous growth frame-
6work where public spending is an input in the production of ﬁnal goods as
well as health services. In addition, and in line with the foregoing discussion,
infrastructure services are assumed to aﬀect the production of goods as well
as the provision of health services. Put diﬀerently, what matters is not only
spending on health per se, but the combination of public spending on health
and infrastructure. As noted earlier, to function properly, hospitals need
access to electricity. With inadequate water, sanitation and waste disposal
facilities, hospitals cannot provide the services that are expected from them.
As far as I know, this paper is the ﬁr s tt oe x a m i n et h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fc o m -
plementarity between health and infrastructure services in production, while
accounting at the same time for substitutability through the government
budget constraint, for the optimal allocation of government expenditure in a
growing economy.
The model also assumes, more conventionally, that individuals can pro-
vide eﬀective services from human capital only if they are healthy. Thus,
by enhancing productivity, health inﬂuences growth indirectly, in addition
to aﬀecting individual welfare.3 More precisely, health is treated as labor-
augmenting, rather than assumed to enter the production function as a sep-
arate factor. It is “eﬀective” labor (educated labor multiplied by the stock
of public health services) that is used in production. A lower ﬂow of health
services reduces therefore the number of eﬀective working days embodied
in each worker. At the same time, health services enter in the household’s
utility function and therefore aﬀect welfare directly. As a result, there is an
optimal allocation of expenditure between health and infrastructure which
3See Zagler and Durnecker (2003) for a more detailed discussion of this channel. van Zon
and Muysken (2001) proposed an early model along these lines. However, they analyzed
only steady-state solutions and did not derive explicitly optimal allocation rules, as I do
here.
7depends on technology for producing goods and health services, as well as
household preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the framework, which assumes that all public services are provided free of
charge and ﬁnanced by a distortionary tax on output. Section III derives the
balanced-growth path and discusses the dynamic properties of the model.
Section IV examines the short- and long-run eﬀects of an increase in spend-
ing shares on infrastructure, health, and education. The issue that we ad-
dress is whether (given that the production of educated labor and health
services depend on infrastructure services) an increase in public spending
on infrastructure the most eﬃcient method to stimulate long-run growth.
As noted earlier, the provision of each category of services requires resources
and this (given the overall constraint on tax revenues) creates trade-oﬀs. The
role of technology and preferences in determining the growth- and welfare-
maximizing allocations of public expenditure are explored in Section V. The
last section of the paper oﬀers some concluding remarks and discusses some
future research perspectives.
2 A Basic Framework
Consider an economy with a constant population and an inﬁnitely-lived rep-
resentative household who produces and consumes a single traded good. The
good can be used for consumption or investment. The government spends
on infrastructure and produces health services, free of charge. It levies a ﬂat
tax on output to ﬁnance its expenditure.
82.1 Production
Output, Y , is produced with private physical capital, KP, public infrastruc-
ture services, GI,a n d“ e ﬀective” labor, deﬁned as the product of the quantity
of labor and productivity, A. With zero population growth, and the popula-
tion size normalized to unity, assuming that the technology is Cobb-Douglas
yields4
Y = G
α
IA
βK
1−α−β
P , (1)
where α,β ∈ (0,1). Health is thus labor-augmenting, as often assumed in
micro-level studies of nutrition and labor productivity.
Productivity depends solely on the availability of health services, H:
A = H
ε, (2)
where ε>0 is a constant elasticity. For simplicity, I will assume in what
follows a linear relationship, so that ε =1 . This assumption is consistent
with the results of Knowles and Owen (1997, Table 3). Using population per
physician and population per hospital bed as proxies for health services, they
found an estimate of ε that varies between 0.81 and 1.04 for their sub-sample
of low-income countries.
Combining (1) and (2) yields
Y =(
GI
KP
)
α(
H
KP
)
βKP, (3)
which implies that in the steady-state, with constant ratios of GI/KP and
H/KP, the output-capital ratio is also constant.
4Throughout the paper, the time subscript t is omitted whenever doing so does not
result in confusion. A dot over a variable is used to denote its time derivative.
92.2 Household Preferences
With C denoting consumption, the household’s instantaneous utility function
is given by
U =
(CκH1−κ)1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
,κ ∈ (0,1), σ 6=1 , (4)
where 1 − κ measures the relative contribution of health to utility and σ
is the intertemporal elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Utility is thus
nonseparable in consumption and health services. This speciﬁcation is similar
to the one used by Barro (1990), Lee (1992), and van Zon and Muysken
(2001), among others.5 The critical diﬀerence, however, is that in those
papers, it is utility-enhancing public spending that enters directly in the
utility function, whereas in the present case what matters is health services,
which are produced (as discussed below) through a combination of public
spending on infrastructure and health. To ensure that the instantaneous
utility function has the appropriate concavity properties in C and H,t h e
restriction κ(1 − 1/σ) < 1 is imposed on σ and κ.
The household maximizes the discounted present value of utility
max
C
V =
Z ∞
0
U exp(−ρt)dt, (5)
subject to the resource constraint
C + ˙ KP =( 1− τ)Y, (6)
where τ ∈ (0,1) is the tax rate on income. For simplicity, the depreciation
rate of private capital is assumed to be zero.
5A closely related speciﬁcation, used for instance by Corsetti and Roubini (1996) and
Turnovsky (1996), is (1 − 1/σ)−1(CHκ)1−1/σ, where now κ>0.
10Note that health considerations could also be introduced by assuming
that poor health is reﬂected in a low value of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, σ, a greater preference for the present (that is, a high value for
ρ) ,o rr e d u c e dl o n g e v i t y( a si nv o nZ o na n dM u y s k e n( 2 0 0 1 ) ) .H o w e v e r ,s u c h
complications may generate multiple equilibria (as in Chakrabarty (2002) for
instance) and are not pursued here.
2.3 Production of Health Services
Production of health services requires combining labor, and government
spending on both infrastructure and health (GI and GH, respectively). As-
suming also a Cobb-Douglas technology yields, and given that population is
constant
H = G
μ
IG
1−μ
H , (7)
where μ ∈ (0,1). The provision of health services takes place therefore under
constant returns to scale.
2.4 Government
The government spends on infrastructure and health services, and levies a
ﬂat tax on output at the rate τ. It cannot issue debt claims and therefore
must keep a balanced budget at each moment in time. The government
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti st h u sg i v e nb y
GH + GI = τY. (8)
Both categories of spending are taken to be a constant fraction of tax
revenue:
Gh = υhτY, for h = H,I. (9)
11The government budget constraint can thus be rewritten as
υH + υI =1 . (10)
3 The Decentralized Equilibrium
In the present setting, a decentralized equilibrium is a set of inﬁnite sequences
for the quantities {C,KP}∞
t=0,s u c ht h a t{C,KP}∞
t=0 maximizes equation (5)
s u b j e c tt o( 6 ) ,a n dt h ep a t h{KP}∞
t=0 satisﬁes equation (6), for given values
of the tax rate, τ, and the spending shares υh,w i t hh = H,I,w h i c hm u s t
also satisfy constraint (10).
This equilibrium can be characterized as follows. The household solves
problem (5) subject to (4) and (6), taking the tax rate, τ, and the sup-
ply of health services, H,a sg i v e n . 6 Using (2) and (1), the current-value
Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as
L =
(CκH1−κ)1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
+ λ
½
(1 − τ)(
GI
KP
)
α(
H
KP
)
βKP − C
¾
,
where λ is the co-state variable associated with constraint (6). From the
ﬁrst-order condition dL/dC =0and the co-state condition ˙ λ = −dL/dKP,
optimality conditions for this problem can be written as, with s ≡ (1−τ)(1−
α − β),
κ(
H
C
)
1−κ(C
κH
1−κ)
−1/σ = λ, (11)
s(
GI
KP
)
α(
H
KP
)
β = s(
Y
KP
)=ρ − ˙ λ/λ, (12)
together with the budget constraint (6) and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞λKP exp(−ρt)=0 . (13)
6By taking H as given, it is assumed that the household does not internalize the fact
that, by increasing output through its consumption and capital accumulation decisions, it
may contribute to generating higher tax revenue and public expenditure on health services.
12Equation (11) can be rewritten as
C =( κ/λ)
1/[1−κ(1−1/σ)]H
(1−κ)(1−1/σ)/[1−κ(1−1/σ)].
Taking logs of this expression and diﬀerentiating with respect to time
yields
˙ C
C
= −ν1(
˙ λ
λ
)+ν2(
˙ H
H
), (14)
where ν1 ≡ 1/[1 − κ(1 − 1/σ)] > 0,a n dν2 ≡ (1 − κ)(1 − 1/σ)ν1.T h u s ,i f
κ =1 , this equation yields the familiar result ˙ C/C = −σ˙ λ/λ.N o t ea l s ot h a t
υ2 < 1 ∀σ 6=1 ,a n dt h a tν1 < 1, ν2 < 0 if σ<1.
From (1),
˙ Y
Y
= α(
˙ GI
GI
)+β(
˙ H
H
)+( 1− α − β)(
˙ KP
KP
).
Using (7), which implies that ˙ H/H = ˙ Y/Y (as a result of constant returns
to scale) and (9), which also implies that ˙ GI/GI = ˙ Y/Y,y i e l d s ˙ Y/Y =
˙ KP/KP. Substituting this result in (14), together with (12), yields
˙ C
C
= ν1
½
s(
Y
KP
) − ρ
¾
+ ν2(
˙ KP
KP
), (15)
which can be rewritten as, with c = C/KP:
˙ c
c
= ν1
½
s(
Y
KP
) − ρ
¾
− (1 − ν2)(
˙ KP
KP
). (16)
Now, from (3),
Y
KP
=(
GI
Y
)
α/(1−α−β)(
H
Y
)
β/(1−α−β),
which can be combined with the budget constraint (6) to give
˙ KP
KP
=
(1 − τ)Y
KP
− c =( 1− τ)(
GI
Y
)
α/η(
H
Y
)
β/η − c, (17)
13where η ≡ 1 − α − β ∈ (0,1). From equations (7) and (9),
H =( υ
μ
Iυ
1−μ
H )τY, (18)
which can be substituted in (17), together with (9), to give
˙ KP
KP
=( 1− τ)(υIτ)
α/η[(υ
μ
Iυ
1−μ
H )τ]
β/η − c = Λ − c. (19)
Substituting this result in (16) yields the following nonlinear diﬀerential
equation in c:
˙ c
c
=( 1− ν2)c +[
s
1 − τ
ν1 − (1 − ν2)]Λ − ν1ρ. (20)
This equation, together with the transversality condition (13), determines
the dynamics of the decentralized economy.
On the balanced-growth path (BGP), consumption and the stock of pri-
vate capital grow at the same constant rate γ = ˙ C/C = ˙ KP/KP,s o˙ c =0 .
But, given that ν2 < 1, the equilibrium is (globally) unstable. Thus, to be
on the BGP, the economy must start there.
Setting ˙ c =0in (20) yields the economy’s steady-state level of the
consumption-capital ratio:
˜ c = Λ +
ν1(ρ − ηΛ)
1 − ν2
.
Substituting this result in (19) yields the steady-state growth rate as
γ =
ν1
1 − ν2
(ηΛ − ρ), (21)
which is positive as long as ρ<η Λ. Thus, the model has no transitional
dynamics; following a shock, the consumption-capital ratio must jump im-
mediately to its new equilibrium value. It then follows from (21) that the
14economy is always on its steady-state growth path. Because H/C is con-
stant and ˙ H/H = ˙ KP/KP along that path, equation (11) implies that
˙ λ/λ = −γ/σ. Thus, the transversality condition (13) is satisﬁed along the
BGP if γ(1 − 1/σ) − ρ<0,t h a ti s , 7
ρ>
½
1+
ν1(1 − 1/σ)
1 − ν2
¾−1 ν1ηΛ(1 − 1/σ)
1 − ν2
.
Noting that ν1(1−1/σ)/(1−ν2)=σ−1, this expression can be rewritten
as
ρ>σ
−1(σ − 1)ηΛ. (22)
Condition (22) is automatically satisﬁed if σ ∈ (0,1).I fσ>1,i ti m p o s e s
an upper bound on the admissible value of the tax rate or one of the spending
shares. For simplicity, it will be assumed in what follows that σ<1.T h e
transversality condition (13) therefore holds irrespective of the particular
values obtained from the analysis of optimal public decisions.
4 Optimal Policies
I now consider the growth and welfare eﬀects of an increase in the tax rate,
taking the composition of spending as constant (that is, dτ > 0 and dυI =
dυH =0 ), as well as a revenue-neutral shift in government spending from
health to infrastructure (that is, dτ =0and dυI = −dυH), assuming that
the allocation of spending is set arbitrarily.
Consider ﬁrst the growth eﬀects. From (21),
sg
(
dγ
dτ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dυh=0
)
= sg
½
−1+( 1− τ)(
α + β
τη
)
¾
,h = I,H (23)
7The condition ρ>γ (1 − 1/σ) is also necessary to guarantee that the integral in (5)
remains bounded.
15sg
½
dγ
dυI
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dτ=0
¾
= sg
½
(
α + μβ
υI
) −
β(1 − μ)
υH
¾
. (24)
Both of these expressions are in general ambiguous. The reason, in the
case of an increase in the tax rate, is the familiar trade-oﬀ examined by Barro
(1990), which implies a hump-shape relationship between τ and γ.E q u a t i o n
(23) implies that the growth-maximizing tax rate is given by
τ
∗ = α + β. (25)
Thus, formula (25) generalizes Barro’s tax-and-spending rule to the case
where spending on health has a positive eﬀect on the marginal product of
capital (by increasing labor productivity), in addition to infrastructure ser-
vices. It accounts therefore for both direct and indirect eﬀects of government
spending on production. Of course, had it been assumed that the elasticity ε
diﬀers from unity in (2), the optimal tax rate would also depend on how re-
sponsive productivity is with respect to health. More speciﬁcally, the impact
of β on the optimal tax rate would be weighted by ε.
Consider now a revenue-neutral increase in the share of spending on in-
frastructure. The ambiguous impact on growth results from two conﬂicting
eﬀects. A rise in the share of spending on infrastructure tends to raise the
marginal product of capital, which raises investment and growth, both di-
rectly and indirectly, through its eﬀect on the production of health services.
At the same time, the reduction in public spending on health lowers growth
by reducing labor productivity. The net eﬀect depends on the parameters
characterizing the technology for producing goods and health services. With
μ =0for instance, an increase in spending in infrastructure would raise
growth if the initial composition of spending υI/υH exceeds the ratio of elas-
ticities in the production of goods, α/β.
16From the budget constraint (10) and (24), the growth-maximizing share
of spending on infrastructure can be shown to be
υ
∗
I =
α + μβ
α + β
, (26)
which is in general greater than α. The “strict” Barro rule (which would
relate the share of spending only to the elasticity of output with respect
to infrastructure services) is thus sub-optimal. In the particular case where
μ =0 , that is, the “standard” case where health services are produced only
with government spending on health, υ∗
I = α/(α + β),w h i c hi sa l s og r e a t e r
than α;a n dw i t hμ =1 , all spending should be allocated to infrastructure
(υ∗
I =1 ).8 Naturally enough, the higher is the elasticity of output of health
services with respect to spending on infrastructure (the higher μ is), the lower
should be the share of spending on health.
Consider now the welfare-maximizing allocation. From (6) and (8), the
economy’s consolidated budget constraint can be written as
Y = C + ˙ KP +( GH + GI),
that is, using (8),
˙ KP =( 1− τ)Y − C, (27)
From (1) and (7), Y = G
α+μβ
I G
β(1−μ)
H K
η
P. Using again (9), as well as (18),
yields
Y = τ
(α+β)/ηυ
(α+μβ)/η
I υ
β(1−μ)/η
H KP. (28)
Using this result, together with (5) and (18), taking into account the fact
that, from the government budget constraint, υH =1− υI, and denoting
8See Agénor (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) for a more detailed discussion of these growth-
maximizing rules in a related model with human capital accumulation.
17by ζP the co-state variable associated with (27) the government’s problem is
therefore to maximize
L =
{Cκ[{υ
μ
I(1 − υI)1−μ}τY]1−κ}1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
+ ζP[(1 − τ)Y − C],
with respect to C, υI, τ,a n dKP, subject to (28). The ﬁrst-order optimality
conditions with respect to C, υI,a n dτ are given by
κ(
H
C
)
1−κ[C
κH
1−κ]
−1/σ = ζP, (29)
(1 − κ)(
C
H
)
κ[C
κH
1−κ]
−1/σ
½
α(1 − μ)+μ
ηυI
−
(1 − μ)(1 − α)
η(1 − υI)
¾
H (30)
= −ζP(1 − τ)Y
½
α + μβ
ηυI
−
β(1 − μ)
η(1 − υI)
¾
,
(1 − κ)(
C
H
)
κ[C
κH
1−κ]
−1/σ(
H
ητ
)=ζPY
½
1 − (1 − τ)
(α + β)
ητ
¾
. (31)
Dividing equation (29) by (30), and (31) by (30), yields, after manipula-
tions,
τ
∗∗ =( α + β)+
1 − κ
κ
(
C
Y
), (32)
υ
∗∗
I =
1
1+Ω
½
α + μβ
α + β
+[ α(1 − μ)+μ]Ω
¾
∈ (0,1), (33)
where
Ω ≡
1 − κ
κ(1 − τ)(α + β)
(
C
Y
) > 0,
and C/Y is constant in the steady state.9
In the particular case where κ =1 , so that utility does not depend on
the (ﬂow) supply of health services, Ω =0and formulas (32) and (33) are
9The solution for τ is admissible only if the steady-state value of the consumption-
output ratio is not too high, where υ∗∗
I is always less than unity (see equation (34) below,
where both υ∗
I and α(1−μ)+μ are less than unity). Note also that the complete dynamics
of the model under a centralized planner is not fully characterized here; this can be done
also the lines discussed in the previous section and the Appendix.
18identical to (25) and (26). In general, however, this is not the case. The
utility-maximizing tax rate exceeds the growth-maximizing rate. The mag-
nitude of the wedge depends on κ; because dτ∗∗/dκ < 0,t h eg r e a t e rt h e
role of health services in utility, the larger the diﬀerence between the two
rates. Note also that the welfare-maximizing tax rate does not depend on
the technology for producing health services.
Using (26), formula (33) can be rewritten as
υ
∗∗
I =
υ∗
I +[ α(1 − μ)+μ]Ω
1+Ω
∈ (0,1) (34)
from which it can readily be veriﬁed that υ∗∗
I <υ ∗
I. Thus, the welfare-
maximizing share of spending on infrastructure is lower than the growth-
maximizing share.
Intuitively, spending on health services is now more “valuable” to the
central planner, given its complementarity with consumption. Choosing an
income tax rate that exceeds the growth-maximizing rate entails a fall in
the balanced growth rate, which tends, on the one hand, to lower welfare.
On the other, however, an increase in the tax rate induces the household to
shift resources from investment to consumption, as well as a higher output
of health services (see (18)). This tends to increase welfare. With κ<1,t h e
positive eﬀect dominates if the optimal tax rate is higher than the growth-
maximizing value.
Similarly, choosing a share of spending on infrastructure that is lower
than the growth-maximizing rate reduces the growth rate but also leads to
a reallocation of government outlays toward health services. If μ is not too
high, this reallocation leads to a higher output of health services, and thus
higher productivity, which tends to mitigate the drop in public outlays in
infrastructure. In turn, with κ<1, the increase in output of health services
19translates into a higher level of consumption (and thus lower investment) and
an increase in welfare. This positive welfare eﬀect dominates the negative
eﬀect of a lower growth rate. The higher μ is, the smaller the diﬀerence
between the two solutions. In the limit case where μ =1 , formula (26) yields
υ∗
I =1 ,s ot h a t ,f r o m( 3 4 ) ,
υ
∗∗
I =
υ∗
I + Ω
1+Ω
=1 ,
which shows that both the growth- and welfare-maximizing solutions imply
that all tax resources should be allocated to infrastructure.
5 A Stock Approach
I now extend the analysis to consider the case where the ﬂow of health ser-
v i c e si sp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h estock of capital in health, KH, which is itself aug-
mented by combining government spending on infrastructure with spending
on health. Speciﬁcally, equation (2) is replaced by
H = KH, (35)
whereas the production function becomes
Y = G
α
IK
β
HK
1−α−β
P =(
GI
KP
)
α(
KH
KP
)
βKP. (36)
The production of public capital in health is given by, using (9),
˙ KH = G
μ
IG
1−μ
H =( υ
μ
Iυ
1−μ
H )τY, (37)
where, for simplicity, a zero depreciation rate is assumed. Thus, to accu-
mulate health capital requires spending not only on health per se,b u ta l s o
on infrastructure. Health capital can therefore be thought of as a composite
20asset. It comprises, for instance, not only a hospital building in a particular
location, but also the road (or portion of road) that gives access to it. The
“conventional” treatment corresponds, again, to μ =0 .
The instantaneous utility function in (4) also has KH replacing H.T h e
budget constraints, (6) and (10), remain the same.
As shown in the Appendix, the model can be manipulated to give a sys-
tem of two nonlinear diﬀerential equations in c = C/KP and kH = KH/KP
(see equations (A14) and (A15)). These equations, together with the initial
condition k0
H, and the transversality condition (13), determine now the dy-
namics of the decentralized economy. The BGP is now a set of sequences
{c,kH}∞
t=0,s u c ht h a tf o rt h ei n i t i a lc o n d i t i o nk0
H, and for given spending
shares and tax rate, equations (A14) and (A15) in the Appendix and the
transversality condition (13) are satisﬁed, with consumption and the stocks
of private capital and public capital in health all growing at the same constant
rate γ = ˙ C/C = ˙ KH/KH = ˙ KP/KP.
From equations (A12) and (A13) in the Appendix, the economy’s growth
rate can be written in the equivalent forms
γ = τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
I ˜ k
−η/(1−α)
H , (38)
γ =
ν1s
1 − ν2
(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ k
β/(1−α)
H −
ν1
1 − ν2
ρ, (39)
where ˜ kH denotes the steady-state value of kH and ω ≡ μ + α/(1 − α).A s
also shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium is saddlepoint stable and the
BGP is unique. The model is thus locally determinate.
Transitional dynamics can be analyzed using the phase diagram depicted
in Figure 1. The upward-sloping curve HH corresponds to combinations of
(c,kH) for which ˙ kH =0 , whereas the downward-sloping curve CC corre-
sponds to combinations of (c,kH) for which ˙ c =0 . The saddlepath, SS,h a s
21a negative slope. As before, a budget-neutral shift in spending toward in-
frastructure has an ambiguous eﬀect on the growth rate and the consumption-
private capital ratio, c. In the “standard” case where μ =0 ,i ta l s ol o w e r s
unambiguously the ratio of health capital to private capital, kH.B u t i n
general, if μ is suﬃciently high, the steady-state value of kH may actually
increase. The positive eﬀect of an increase in infrastructure spending may
thus outweigh the negative eﬀect of lower spending on health services on the
stock of health capita. Graphically, CC always shifts to the left, whereas
HH can shift in either direction, depending on the parameters of the model.
If μ and α/β are relatively high, curve HH shifts to the right (as illustrated
in the upper panel of the ﬁgure), and the new equilibrium (point E0)i sc h a r -
acterized by a higher capital ratio and a lower consumption-capital ratio.
By contrast, if μ and α/β are relatively low, curve HH shifts to the left
(as depicted in the lower panel). At the new equilibrium, the public-private
capital ratio is lower the consumption-capital ratio is lower. In both cases
the adjustment path corresponds to the sequence EAE0.
From equations (38) and (39), it can readily be established that the
growth-maximizing tax rate and share of spending on infrastructure are again
given by (25) and (26). Thus, the growth-maximizing allocation of govern-
ment expenditure does not depend on whether it is the ﬂow of spending on
health, or the stock of health capital, that matters in determining household
utility and productivity.
Given that the model has now transitional dynamics, calculating the tax
rate and share of spending on infrastructure that maximize lifetime utility
is more involved. In general, the rates of growth of consumption and health
capital are not constant during the transition to the BGP, and neither is
22their ratio. Formally, from (9) and (35),
Y =( υIτ)
α/(1−α)K
β/(1−α)
H K
η/(1−α)
P . (40)
Using this result, together with (5) and (37), the government’s problem
is now to maximize
L =
(CκK
1−κ
H )1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
+ ζP[(1 − τ)Y − C]+ζH[υ
μ
I(1 − υI)
1−μτY],
with respect to C, υI, τ, KH,a n dKP,w i t hY deﬁn e di n( 4 0 ) ,a n dw i t hζH
denoting the co-state variable associated with equation (37). The solution of
this problem yields the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞ζhKh exp(−ρt)=0 ,h = P,H,
together with the following optimality conditions:
κ(
KH
C
)
1−κ[C
κK
1−κ
H ]
−1/σ = ζP, (41)
ζP
α(1 − τ)
(1 − α)υI
+ ζH
½
ω
υI
−
1 − μ
1 − υI
¾
υ
μ
I(1 − υI)
1−μτ =0 , (42)
ζP[
α(1 − τ)
(1 − α)τ
− 1] + ζHυ
μ
I(1 − υI)
1−μ[1 +
α
1 − α
]=0 , (43)
(
C
KH
)
κ[CκK
1−κ
H ]−1/σ
(1 − κ)−1 +
βY
(1 − α)KH
½
(1 − τ)ζP +
ζHυ
μ
Iτ
(1 − υI)μ−1
¾
= ρζH − ˙ ζH,
(44)
ηY
(1 − α)KP
©
(1 − τ)ζP + ζHυ
μ
I(1 − υI)
1−μτ
ª
= ρζP − ˙ ζP. (45)
Conditions (42) and (43) can be combined to give
α(1 − τ)
(α − τ)(1 − α)
= ω −
(1 − μ)υI
1 − υI
,
which can be written in implicit form
Φ(υI,τ;μ)=0 . (46)
23To solve explicitly for the optimal tax rate and share of spending on in-
frastructure requires solving jointly equations (41), (44), (45), (46), together
with (6) and (37). Together they can be combined into a dynamic system in
c, kH, z = ζP/ζH, and either τ or υI (with the other variable derived from
(46)). In general, therefore, τ and υI will be constant only when the economy
settles on its balanced growth path; and given the complexity of the model,
the determination of the welfare-maximizing, time-varying policies can only
be done numerically. Because the transitional dynamics (and thus cumula-
tive welfare calculations) are sensitive to the choice of parameters and initial
values, general results are diﬃcult to establish. Restricting the analysis only
to the balanced growth path, as in Barro (1990) for instance, does not allow
clear-cut results either.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper studied the optimal allocation of government spending between
health and infrastructure in an endogenous growth framework. The amount
of eﬀective labor services that a worker can provide was assumed to be pro-
portional to his average health. In turn, average health is proportional to
the total amount of health services produced in the economy. Thus, by en-
hancing the productivity of individuals (through higher intakes of calories or
micro-nutrients, for instance), health inﬂuences growth directly, in addition
to aﬀecting individual welfare. Infrastructure services are assumed to aﬀect
the production of goods as well as the provision of health services.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rf o c u s e do nt h ec a s ew h e r ei ti st h eﬂow of
health services that aﬀects production and utility. It was shown that the
model then has no transitional dynamics. The analysis also showed that
24there is a trade-oﬀ in increasing public spending on infrastructure: on the
one hand, it leads to an increase in the provision of infrastructure services to
production of both goods and health services, which increases growth, but
on the other, it lowers resources allocated to health and lowers productiv-
ity, which in turn lowers growth. Thus, the long-run eﬀect on steady-state
growth is ambiguous; depending on the various parameters of the economy,
a revenue-neutral increase in spending on infrastructure can actually lower
the growth rate. The growth-maximizing tax rate was shown to be equal
to the sum of the elasticities of output with respect to infrastructure ser-
vices and “eﬀective” labor, whereas the optimal allocation of expenditure
between health and infrastructure was shown to depend on the parameters
characterizing the technology for producing goods as well as health services.
Moreover, the welfare-maximizing tax rate was found to be higher than
the growth-maximizing value, whereas the welfare-maximizing share of spend-
ing on infrastructure was shown to be lower than the growth-maximizing solu-
tion. Intuitively, choosing for instance the share of spending on infrastructure
so as to maximize the growth rate raises, on the one hand, consumption and
welfare. On the other, however, it reduces outlays on health, which tends to
lower welfare if the supply of health services falls. As long as the elasticity
of output of health services with respect to spending on infrastructure is not
too high, the government is better oﬀ reducing the share of spending that it
allocates to infrastructure; in doing so, it ensures that the supply of health
services increases. Because health and consumption are complementary in
preferences, this ensures that the representative household will increase con-
sumption. Despite the consumption loss associated with a lower rate of capi-
tal accumulation (induced by the shift from investment to consumption), the
net eﬀect on utility will be positive. Thus, restricting the share of resources
25allocated to infrastructure to a value below the growth-maximizing rate is
welfare improving–as long as direct government spending on health has a
positive eﬀect on output of health services. If the production of health ser-
vices involves only public infrastructure, the growth- and welfare-maximizing
shares of spending on infrastructure is the same. Similarly, choosing an in-
come tax rate that exceeds the growth-maximizing rate entails a fall in the
balanced growth rate, which tends, on the one hand, to lower welfare. On
the other, however, an increase in the tax rate induces the household to shift
resources from investment to consumption, as well as higher production of
health services. This tends to increase welfare–suﬃc i e n t l ys ot oe n s u r et h a t
the net eﬀect is positive.
The second part of the paper extended the analysis to consider the case
where production and utility depend on the ﬂow of services produced by the
stock of public capital in health. The production of health capital, in turn,
was assumed to result from a combination of government spending on health
and infrastructure. The growth-maximizing values of the tax rate and share
of spending on infrastructure were shown to be identical to those obtained
with the ﬂow approach. Due to the complexity of the model, however, no
general results could be established.
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in various direc-
tions. First, alternative ﬁnancing mechanisms could be considered. The
trade-oﬀ identiﬁed earlier between spending on health and infrastructure
depends in part on how spending is ﬁnanced. With money ﬁnancing, for
instance, higher government outlays on health and infrastructure may not
always boost growth. To the extent that ﬁscal deﬁcits lead to higher inﬂa-
tion, the negative impact on macroeconomic stability and growth of such
spending could outweigh the beneﬁcial eﬀects of welfare. An important les-
26son of the model is that a more eﬀective way to increase welfare may be not
be to raise public spending on health, but rather to increase spending on
infrastructure, which may be more of a “binding” constraint.
Second, it may be useful to introduce quality considerations. As noted
in the recent literature on public infrastructure and growth, congestion costs
are important in assessing the impact of public investment. But they may
also be important in assessing the eﬀe c to fh e a l t ho ng r o w t h ,t ot h ee x t e n t
that access to public health capital is limited. A recent press release by the
World Health Organization noted that hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa are
“getting worse in terms of both the scope and quality of health care they
provide.” For instance, the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people varies
only from 0.9 to 2.9 in the region, compared to 4.0 in the United States
and 8.7 in France.10 Pressure on health capital may alter the quality of
the services being produced, and therefore mitigate their growth-enhancing
eﬀects. More generally, congestion eﬀects may give rise to nonlinearities in
the relationship between health, infrastructure, and growth. In turn, these
nonlinearities may explain the persistence of poverty traps, characterized by
persistent low growth rates in per capita income (see Agénor and Aizenman
(2005)).
Third, the model could be extended to account for the fact that health
may have an indirect eﬀect on growth through education and the accumu-
lation of human capital. Good health and nutrition are prerequisites for
eﬀective learning. Poor nutritional status can adversely aﬀect children’s cog-
nitive development, which may translate into poor educational attainment
or higher drop-out rates (see Behrman (1996) and Bundy and others (2005)).
10Similarly, the number of doctors per 100,000 people is 16 in sub-Saharan Africa,
compared to between 33 and 48 in South Asia, and 200 and 300 in developed countries.
27Conversely, increases in life expectancy raise the incentive to invest in edu-
cation, because the returns to schooling are expected to accrue over longer
periods. Moreover, intra-family allocations regarding school and work time
of children can be adjusted in the face of disease within the family; in turn,
these adjustments may inﬂuence the accumulation of physical and human
capital and thus long-run growth. For instance, as discussed by Corrigan,
Glomm, and Mendez (2005), when parents become ill, children may be pulled
out of school to care for them, take on other responsibilities in the household,
or work to support their siblings. Agénor and Neanidis (2005) extend the
present model to consider the impact of health on education.
Finally, despite the wealth of micro evidence on the eﬀect of infrastruc-
ture on health (as discussed in the introduction), there has been few attempts
to date to estimate directly, through cross-country regressions, the magni-
tude of this eﬀect. The foregoing analysis showed, that choosing between a
“ﬂow” or “stock” treatment of health services may be largely a matter of
a n a l y t i c a lc o n v e n i e n c e ,g i v e nt h a t( a tl e a s ti ft h ef o c u si ss t r i c t l yo ng r o w t h )
optimal solutions are independent of that choice. However, from a practical
and policy standpoint, it is important to test empirically for the relevant
speciﬁcation, building perhaps on the results of Gyimah-Brempong and Wil-
son (2004, Appendix A). Although data limitations may prove severe, these
empirical tests may lead to better understanding of the role of infrastructure
in the growth process. Indeed, an implication of the model is that standard
growth-accounting exercises, may provide misleading estimates of the role of
capital (public and private) and labor. If, public capital in infrastructure
aﬀects productivity, and thus the eﬀective supply of labor, standard decom-
positions may under-estimate the contribution of that component. A more
appropriate approach to identify the overall eﬀect of public capital would
28then be to estimate a simultaneous equations model explaining the growth
rate per capita and the eﬀective supply of labor.
29Appendix
Dynamic Structure, Stability and Uniqueness
The model consists now of equations (6), (8), (9), (12), (14), with ˙ KH/KH
replacing ˙ H/H, (36), and (37). These equations are repeated here for con-
venience:
˙ KP =( 1− τ)Y − C, (A1)
˙ λ/λ = ρ − s(
Y
KP
), (A2)
˙ C
C
= −ν1(
˙ λ
λ
)+ν2(
˙ KH
KH
), (A3)
Y =(
GI
KP
)
α(
KH
KP
)
βKP, (A4)
GH + GI = τY, (A5)
GI = υIτY, GH =( 1− υI)τY, (A6)
˙ KH = G
μ
IG
1−μ
H , (A7)
where ν1 and ν2 a r ea sd e ﬁn e di nt h et e x t .
Substituting equation (A4) in (A1) yields
˙ KP =( 1− τ)(
GI
KP
)
α(
KH
KP
)
βKP − C. (A8)
From (A4) and (A6),
GI = υIτY = υIτ(
GI
KP
)
α(
KH
KP
)
βKP,
that is, with kH = KH/KP,
GI
KP
= υIτ(
GI
KP
)
αk
β
H,
or equivalently
GI
KP
=( υIτ)
1/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H . (A9)
30Substituting (A9) in (A8) yields
˙ KP
KP
=( 1− τ)(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H − c, (A10)
where again c = C/KP.
From (A4) and (A6),
GH = υHτY = υHτ(
GI
KP
)
α(
KH
KP
)
βKP,
so that, using (A9),
GH
KP
= υHτ(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H = υHτ
1/(1−α)υ
α/(1−α)
I k
β/(1−α)
H . (A11)
Equation (A7) gives
˙ KH
KH
=(
GI
GH
)
μ(
GH
KP
)(
KP
KH
),
so that, using (A6) and (A11),
˙ KH
KH
=(
υI
υH
)
μυHτ
1/(1−α)υ
α/(1−α)
I k
−η/(1−α)
H ,
where η ≡ 1−α−β,a sd e ﬁned in the text. This expression can be rewritten
as
˙ KH
KH
= τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H , (A12)
where ω ≡ μ + α/(1 − α). Equation (38) in the text is derived by setting
kH = ˜ kH and ˙ KH/KH = γ in (A12).
Using (A2) and (A12), equation (A3) can be rewritten as
˙ C
C
= ν1[s(
Y
GI
)(
GI
KP
) − ρ]+ν2τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H ,
or, using (A6),
˙ C
C
= ν1s(υIτ)
−1(
GI
KP
)+ν2τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H − ν1ρ,
31that is, using (A9),
˙ C
C
= ν1s(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H + ν2τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H − ν1ρ. (A13)
Equation (39) in the text is derived by setting kH = ˜ kH and ˙ C/C = γ in
(A13) and using (38) to substitute out for the second term on the right-hand
side.
Combining equations (A10), (A13), and (A12) yields, noting that s ≡
(1 − τ)η:
˙ c
c
=( 1 −τ)ν(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H +ν2τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H −ν1ρ+c, (A14)
˙ kH
kH
= τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H − (1 − τ)(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H + c, (A15)
with ν ≡ ην1 − 1 < 0,g i v e nt h a tν1 < 1 for σ<1,a n dη<1.
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the steady state, equations
(A14)-(A15) can be linearized to give
∙
˙ c
˙ kH
¸
=
∙
a11 a12
a21 a22
¸∙
c − ˜ c
kH − ˜ kH
¸
, (A16)
where the aij are given by
a11 =˜ c, a21 = ˜ kH,
a12 =
β˜ c(1 − τ)ν
1 − α
(υIτ)
α/(1−α)˜ k
−η/(1−α)
H −
η˜ cν2τ1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υω
I
1 − α
˜ k
−η/(1−α)−1
H ,
a22 = −
ητ1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υω
I ˜ k
−η/(1−α)
H
1 − α
−
β(1 − τ)(υIτ)α/(1−α)˜ k
β/(1−α)
H
1 − α
< 0,
where ˜ c and ˜ kH denote the stationary values of c and kH.G i v e nt h a tν2 < 0
for σ<1, the second term in the expression for a12 is positive; but the ﬁrst
is negative, given that ν<0.C o e ﬃcient a12 is thus in general ambiguous.
Given that ∂ν1/∂σ, ∂ |ν2|/∂σ > 0,i ti sa s s u m e di nw h a tf o l l o w st h a tσ is
suﬃciently small to ensure that a12 > 0.
From (A16), the slopes of CC and HH in Figure 1 are given by
dc
dkH
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
˙ c=0
= −
a12
a11
< 0,
dc
dkH
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
˙ kH=0
= −
a22
a21
> 0.
32The consumption-capital ratio c can jump, whereas kH is predetermined
and evolves continuously. Saddlepath stability requires one unstable (pos-
itive) root. To ensure that this condition holds, the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the dynamic system (A16), ∆,m u s t
be negative, that is, ∆ = a11a22 −a12a21 < 0. This condition is always satis-
ﬁed in the present case. The slope of the saddlepath SS,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
−a12/(˜ c − ϕ),w h e r eϕ is the negative root of the system, is negative.
From (A14), setting ˙ c =0yields
˜ c = ν1ρ − (1 − τ)ν(υIτ)
α/(1−α)k
β/(1−α)
H − ν2τ
1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υ
ω
Ik
−η/(1−α)
H . (A17)
Expression (A17) can be substituted in (A15) with ˙ kH =0to yield the
implicit form
F(˜ kH)=
τ1/(1−α)υ
1−μ
H υω
I
˜ k
η/(1−α)
H
−
(1 − τ)ην1(υIτ)α/(1−α)
(1 − ν2)˜ k
−β/(1−α)
H
+
ν1ρ
1 − ν2
=0 ,
from which it can be established that F˜ kH < 0.T h u s ,F(˜ kH) cannot cross the
horizontal axis from below. Now, we also have limkH→0 F(˜ kH)=+ ∞ and
limkH→+∞ F(˜ kH)=−∞.G i v e nt h a tF(˜ kH) is a continuous, monotonically
decreasing function of ˜ kH, there is a unique positive value of ˜ kH that satisﬁes
F(˜ kH)=0 . From (A17), there is also a unique positive value of ˜ c. Thus, the
BGP is unique.
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